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Foreign aid has been on a downward trend since at least the early eighties. Despite the 
commitments of donor governments, the GDP share of  foreign aid for DAC countries has fallen to 
slightly more than 0,2% in the early part of this decade. 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore the macro determinants of  the amount of foreign aid. 
Surprisingly enough, not much attention has been devoted in the literature to this issue. Most of the 
research has focussed either on the effectiveness of aid (“does aid promote growth and help 
alleviating poverty”?) or to the cross country allocation of a given amount of foreign aid (“is foreign 
aid motivated by donor’s political and commercial interests or by recipients’ needs?”). In both 
cases, the total aid budget is taken as given and its determinants remain therefore unexplored.  
 
Our main finding is that the size of the budget aid is a function of the donor country’s fiscal 
situation, even after controlling for the government’s political orientation, the cyclical position of 
the donor economy, and its income per capita level. In light of these results, we argue that advocates 
of foreign aid should strongly lobby in favour of fiscal discipline. The alternative strategy of 
pushing for a more lenient budgetary treatment of foreign aid may be loaded with risks, and even 
turn to be counterproductive, particularly if the list of “virtuous” exceptions becomes exceedingly 
long. This is exactly what seems to have happened with the revision of the Stability and Growth 
pact. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign aid has been on a downward trend since at least the early eighties. Despite the 
commitments of donor governments, the GDP share of  foreign aid for DAC countries has fallen to 
slightly more than 0,2% in the early part of this decade. International institutions have been 
impotent witnesses of such development and have been forced to scale down their objectives for 
foreign assistance. In the early eighties the UN general Assembly unanimously set the target level 
of foreign aid at 1% of rich countries GDP; today, it contents itself with a more modest objective of 
0.7%. Even this new target however may be hard to achieve. The European Council in 2002 set a 
far less ambitious objective, 0,39% of the EU GDP in 2006; three years later, it eventually 
committed to the UN target of 0,7%, albeit with a more relaxed deadline in 2015. Unfortunately, 
many EU member countries took exception to the Council declaration, citing their difficult budget 
situation and, in the end, casting a shadow on the EU ability to reach such a target.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the macro determinants of  the amount of foreign aid.  
Surprisingly enough, not much attention has been devoted in the literature to this issue. Most of the 
research has focussed either on the effectiveness of aid (“does aid promote growth and help 
alleviating poverty”?) or to the cross country allocation of a given amount of foreign aid (“is foreign 
aid motivated by donor’s political and commercial interests or by recipients’ needs?”). In both 
cases, the total aid budget is taken as given and its determinants remain therefore unexplored, 
except perhaps for the implicit assumption that a more effective use of aid could be instrumental in 
overcoming political resistance to a more generous budgetary allocation. 
 
In the policy debate, the decline in foreign aid is  generally attributed to the increasingly restrictive 
orientation of fiscal policies in donor countries. Development aid is supposed to have suffered 
disproportionately from the fallouts of fiscal retrenchment, mainly because of the weakness of 
domestic political support. To remedy this trend, advocates of foreign aid in industrial countries 
have actively supported a more lenient, approach to the budgetary treatment of development 
assistance. In Europe, in particular, there have been repeated calls to exclude foreign aid from the 
application of the Growth and Stability pact. In 2004, the Ecofin council acceded to such requests 
and included foreign aid in a (fairly long) list of virtuous spending items that should be favourably 
considered by the Commission in assessing the budgetary situation of individual EU countries.  
 
This strategy however may be loaded with risks. First and foremost, it is by no means granted that 
the substantive cuts in the foreign aid budget have been mainly due to the restrictive orientation of   3
fiscal policies. Causality may have gone the opposite way, with the continuing deterioration on the 
fiscal position in donor countries during the eighties forcing substantial cuts in the foreign aid 
budget. Interestingly enough, the downsizing of development assistance predates in most donor 
countries the adoption of more rigorous fiscal policies. Under this alternative view, advocates of 
foreign aid should then lobby for aggregate fiscal discipline, under the notion that fiscal health is 
associated with greater spending on aid. Second, even the call for a more lenient treatment of 
foreign aid may in the end turn to be counterproductive,  if the list of exceptions happens to be 
exceedingly long. Revealingly, this is exactly what seems to have happened at the European level. 
The Ecofin virtuous list includes a very broad set of items (public investment, military and security 
spending, the costs of structural reforms, and so on). Aggregate spending on such a list would easily 
reach 4-5% of EU GDP. The exclusion of these items from the Maastricht definition of the budget 
would then lead to an exceedingly large deterioration in fiscal balances. Market constraints rather 
than peer pressures would then force policy makers in donor countries to resort again to fiscal 
stringency, with a negative impact on official development assistance. In the end, therefore, the aid 
budget may suffer more than it had gained initially from the more lenient treatment.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a brief review of 
the relevant literature. We then a look at the main trends in the aid budget and its relations with the 
fiscal positions of donor countries. In section 4, we turn to the econometric analysis. Policy 
implications and conclusions are presented in the last section.  
 
 
2. What the literature says. 
 
Why give aid? This has been the key question for the aid literature in the last 50 years.  
 
The question has many facets, however. First, it is concerned with the effectiveness of aid. If aid 
was ineffective in achieving its objectives, was mainly spent on white elephants projects and helped 
support corrupt dictatorships, it should either be discontinued or, whenever possible, radically 
overhauled. Similarly, its role should be reconsidered, if alternative more effective tools were 
available to reach its social and developmental objectives. An early contribution to the debate came 
from Weisskopf (1972) who argued that aid discourages domestic saving and, as a result, hinders 
the long run development prospects of the recipient countries. Papanek’s (1972) rebuke showed that 
aid is often given in response to temporary income shortfalls and the latter are typically associated   4
with a (temporary) reduction in saving. Accordingly, the negative association between aid and 
saving found by Weisskpopf was likely to be spurious. Indeed, Papanek’s own evidence showed 
that aid and saving were basically unrelated, provided one controlled for exogenous shocks.  
 
One of the key merit of this early debate was to highlight the endogenous nature of aid. Abstracting 
from such a consideration would be equivalent to assess the health effect of a medical treatment 
without allowing for the fact that treatments are prescribed only in the presence of a health problem. 
This is indeed akin to the evaluation of the effectiveness of IMF programs. Countries that rely on 
IMF loans are not randomly selected. Moreover, the amount of the loan is not independent of the 
borrowing country’s initial conditions. The neglect of such considerations is bound to bias the 
assessment of the effectiveness of IMF loans, typically in a downward direction.  
 
What the early literature did not do was to allow for the fact that different (aid recipient) countries 
pursue different policies and that the quality of their policy and institutional environment is likely to 
affect the effectiveness of aid. A key contribution in this respect came from Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) who showed that the growth impact of aid was itself a function of the policy environment. 
The paper was the subject of much controversy, with Guillaumont and Chauvet (2004) arguing that 
what mattered most was the recipient’s vulnerability to shocks (with aid being less effective in more 
vulnerable countries), Collier, Haufler and Soderbom (2004) emphasizing the role of civil wars 
(internal conflicts are typically associated with an increase in aid and a fall in growth), and 
Dalgaard, Hansen and Trap (2004) highlighting the impact of climatic conditions. By and large, 
however, the key finding by Burnside and Dollar that the effectiveness of aid is positively related to 
the quality of the domestic policy environment did survive to these more comprehensive analyses, 
even though its quantitative significance was found to be somewhat more limited. A much more 
cautionary note is struck by Rajan and Subramanian (2005a,b) who fail to find any significant 
impact of aid on growth even after carefully controlling for initial conditions and the policy stance.  
 
The fact that aid effectiveness may be related to the domestic policy stance raises a different 
question, that has been central to much of the literature. How should a given volume of aid be 
allocated among recipient countries? Two strategies can be distinguished. First, the granting of aid 
could be made conditional to the recipient country implementing appropriate policies. This was the 
approach adopted by most donors and still prevalent in the granting of debt relief to the highly 
indebted poor countries. The problem with this approach is that conditionality has not proved to be 
terribly effective, with the same policy measures being bought repeatedly by bilateral donors and   5
multilateral agencies. An alternative strategy, advocated by Easterly (2001), is to adopt a greater 
selectivity, and grant assistance only to those countries that have already in place sound policies. 
This is, for instance, the underlying principle of Collier and Dollar (2004) in their aid allocation 
process aimed at maximizing the worldwide reduction in poverty.  
 
The effectiveness of aid is also likely to depend on the ultimate motivations of donors. A number of 
contributions have tried to assess which motivation -  donor’s political and commercial interest or 
recipients’ needs -  dominates. The consensus view until recently was that motivations differed 
among countries and over time, More specifically, the Nordic countries, including the Netherlands, 
seemed to be more responsive to the poverty and developmental objectives, France to political and 
commercial objectives, while the US, the UK and to some extent also Germany pursuing both 
objectives (Grilli and Daveri, 1993) . The more recent contribution by Alesina and Dollar (2002) 
shows that political considerations, in particular the colonial past and the voting pattern in the UN, 
are paramount in affecting the distribution of aid among recipient countries.  
 
Interestingly enough, all of the contribution surveyed so far take for given the total amount of aid 
and investigate either its impact or its determinants. This is most evident in the much cited 
contribution of Collier and Dollar (2004), whose focus is exclusively on how to maximize the 
poverty reduction effect of a given volume of aid.  
 
Examining how the aggregate aid budget is determined is not however an ancillary or subordinate 
question. This is the issue to which we turn in the next two sections of the paper.  
 
 
3. Fiscal policy and foreign aid 
 
Government must choose among competing allocations of limited resources. Most if not all of 
government spending is to some extent subject to the vagaries of the budgetary process. This is 
particularly true of discretionary items, such as official development assistance. There are good 
reasons to believe that, faced with budgetary difficulties, policy makers will first cut discretionary 
spending, with the least priority items taking the biggest toll.  
 
For the sake of exposition we develop a simple model, where policy makers face a standard budget 
constraint:   6
 
t t t t A PS B r B + − + = + ) 1 ( 1        ( 1 )  
 
where Bt indicates the stock of public debt at time t, r is the interest rate, At denotes a discretionary 
spending item (say, foreign aid) and PSt is the primary surplus (excluding At). Suppose that policy 
makers seek to minimize the gap between At and its target level A*. They also dislike higher future 
debt (Bt+1), to the extent that it may constrain their future choices or put an undue burden on future 
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where α  is the weight on At in the policy-maker’s preferences. Maximizing the objective function 













=      (3) 
 
Equation (3) is consistent with the notion that discretionary spending is largely a function of the 
country’s budgetary position. Either an increase in the primary surplus, PSt, or a fall in the 
outstanding public debt stock will lead to an increase in the level of discretionary spending, At. In 
short, a strong fiscal position will be associated with higher discretionary spending, including on 
official development assistance. In addition, a larger value of α, i.e. a larger  weight of A in the 
policy maker’s utility function, should be associated with a greater rigidity of A and, as a result, a 
more limited responsiveness to changes in the budgetary conditions.  
 
The model can easily generalized to the case where two forms of discretionary spending compete 
for the policy maker’s attention. It can be shown once more that a stronger fiscal position will lead 
to higher spending on both items, with the allocation of spending being a function of their relative 
weights in the policy maker’s preferences.   
 
                                                 
1 See Gali and Perotti (2003) for a careful analysis of a fiscal reaction function.   7
So far for theory. What about the empirical evidence? Consider fig 1, showing the scatter plot for 
net official development assistance and public sector debt, both as a percentage of GDP, for a 
sample of 15 donor countries between 1980 and 2004. The schedules slopes downward, suggesting 













We also look at total official flows, i.e. the sum of official development assistance and other non 
concessional official flows, in fig. 2 and at net aid transfers, i.e. the carefully defined measure of 
foreign aid by Roodman (2004)
2 in fig. 3. In both cases, we find again a negative correlation 
between aid and domestic debt.  
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In fig 4, we take one step further and relates net aid transfers with net government lending, i.e. the 
public sector budgetary balance. The correlation is positive as expected – a stronger budgetary 












While the evidence so far, in particular the negative correlation between foreign aid and public 
sector debt, is consistent with the simple model outlined above, not much should be read in this 
relationship, however, since it aggregates countries with different propensities for official 
development assistance and includes periods with fairly different economic conditions. Only careful 
econometric analysis can detect whether the pattern of figure 1 is supported by existing evidence. 
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4. The econometric analysis of total aid flows  
 
We first discuss the estimating equation. We then review the data to be used in the econometric 
analysis and finally present our results 
 
a) the econometric equation 
 
The estimating equation is basically inspired by the model outlined in the previous section. 
Accordingly, total aid flows (At) are assumed to be a function of the fiscal policy stance, as 
measured by the aggregate fiscal deficit
3 ( Dt =  rBt -PSt ) and the stock of debt (Bt). All variables 
are normalized by GDP. Additional controls include the lagged level of aid flows (to allow for 
gradual adjustment to the target A*) and the output gap (to capture the impact of unexpected output 
shock). Formally: 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 4 3 2 1 * * − − + − + + + = t t t t t t t t GDP A Y Y Y GDP B GDP D GDP A β β β β α  (4) 
 
where Y is output, Y* denotes potential output, and (Y-Y*)/Y* is the output gap. We expect  β1 < 0 (a 
larger deficit indicates a weaker fiscal position and hence will depress spending on aid), β2 < 0 (a 
larger stock of debt will force policy makers to cut discretionary spending), β4 > 0 (reflecting 
persistence in budgetary allocation) and β3 having either sign (since a positive output shock may not 
necessarily lead to higher spending). Equation 3 predicts that the coefficients  on debt (B/GDP) and 
on deficit (D/GDP) should be equal, i.e. that β1 = β2, an easily testable implication.    
.  
We also know from eq. 3 that the level  of foreign aid will be a function of its desired level (A*). In 
turn, the choice of A* may be a function of both income per capita in the donor country and the 
government’s political orientation. Accordingly, we will investigate whether the actual 
disbursement of aid is a function of income per capita at home and the government’s political 
orientation. Finally, as shown again by equation 3, the actual level of aid is a function of its weight 
in the policy maker’s preference. Indeed, different governments may weigh differently foreign aid. 
Hence, the government’s political orientation could affect the level of aid through two channels at 
least, namely through its impact either on A* (a level effect) or on the policy maker’s preference 
parameter α (a slope effect) or through both effects. To assess whether the slope effect is at work, 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, we could include among the regressors the primary surplus, PSt. In this case, however, the coefficient on 
gross debt (β2 ) would no longer be constant but would depend on the level of the interest rate (see eq. 3). We prefer 
therefore to rely on the specification with the budgetary balance, Dt, where β2 is  not a function of rt.    11
we will estimate an equation where the responsiveness of aid to budgetary conditions is a function 
of the government’s political orientation. Putting all together, we will also rely on the following 
relatively more general specification:  
 
( ) ( )
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where POt is the political orientation of the government at time t. In eq. 5, the parameters α1 and α2 
are meant to capture the impact of income per capita and the government’s political orientation on  
the desired level of aid, A*, while β12 and  β22 reflect the influence of PO on the policy maker’s 
preference parameter for foreign aid. Again, we will test, and eventually impose, the restrictions 
that β1 = β2 and  β12 = β22. 
 
b) the data 
 
Foreign aid flows data come from the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. We 
control for loans repayments and rely accordingly on net flow data. We consider two alternative 
measures of official flows: net official development assistance (ODA), that comprises grants and 
loans with a least a grant element of 25%, and total official flows (TOF), that also includes all other 
transaction whose main objective is other than development or whose grant element is less than 
25%. In addition, we rely on Roodman net aid transfer (NAT) data that are based on a net transfer 
rather than a net flow concept and, accordingly, net out interest payments.  
 
Fiscal data, primary surplus and gross debt stock,  also come from the OECD. We rely on gross 
debt rather than on net debt, as most public sector assets have no clear valuation and, accordingly, 
both markets participants and policy makers tend to base their assessment  on gross rather than net 
debt. We do not adjust the level of the primary surplus for cyclical conditions, given that we have 
separately included the output gap in the list of regressors.  
 
Finally, data on government’s political orientation come from work at the Fondazione Enrico Mattei 
(FEEM, 2005). The index ranges from 1 to 10, with a larger value being associated with a more 
conservative government. On the (perhaps debatable) assumption that conservative governments   12
place less value on foreign aid and international solidarity, we expect a negative impact of POt on 
the level of our dependent variable.  
 
c) the results 
 
We first assess the stationarity properties of our series. We rely throughout on the Im-Pesaran-Shin 
test for panel data. All regressors are found to be stationary with comfortable significance levels 
(see table A in the appendix). For the dependent variable the pictures is mixed, however. While 
total official flows are stationary, the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the official 
development assistance and the net aid transfer variables. In the end , we stick to our priori belief 
that aid variables as a percentage of GDP are stationary and report results for all the three dependent 
variables.  
 
We first estimate eq. 4 on a sample of 15 donors countries between 1980 and 2004. We are 
perfectly aware that the pooling of 15 donor countries is a fairly strong assumption. Different 
countries may have different preferences with respect to foreign aid. These differences will be 
partly captured by the use of a fixed effect framework that allow for different intercepts among 
countries. However, as noted above, countries may differ also in the responsiveness of aid to 
budgetary conditions. We try to control for this possibility by introducing the policy maker’s 
political orientation among the explanatory variables and, in addition, check whether interaction 
effects with fiscal indicators are significant. Finally, in a further attempt to reduce heterogeneity, we 
also consider separately European countries, with a view also to identifying the impact of the 
Stability and Growth pact.  
 
Econometric results for the full sample are reported in table 1. We control for both time and country 
fixed effects. The latter are designed to capture differences in cross country preferences for foreign 
aid. We present our findings for total official flows (TOF) in column 1, for official development 
assistance (ODA) in column 2,  and for net aid transfers (NAT) in column 3. Three main facts stand 
out. First, gross debt is a significant determinant of aid flows. The effect is not negligible. A ten 
percent increase in the ratio of public sector debt to GDP is associated with a fall of 0.012% in the 
GDP share of foreign aid in the short run and of 0.023% in the long run. Secondly, the impact of the 
budget is not well defined, being positive for ODA and NAT, as expected, but negative for TOF. In 
all three cases, though, the effect is not statistically different from zero. Moreover, when we impose 
the constraint that the coefficients on gross debt and net lending are equal (β1 = β2), the restriction is   13




In table 2, we focus on EU countries only. We test and impose the restriction that β1 = β2. We also 
assess whether the link between fiscal policy and foreign aid has changed during the nineties. For 
this purpose, we introduce among the regressors a dummy variable D92 (that takes a value of 1 after 
1992 and zero otherwise) and interact it with the other explanatory variables. The main results can 
be summarized as follows. First, as for the full sample, a large deficit and high stock of public debt 
have a depressing effect on foreign aid. The effect is however found to be substantially larger than 
for the full sample, reflecting a greater sensitivity of foreign aid to fiscal conditions in the EU 
compared to other OECD countries. Second, the impact of the fiscal stance is not significantly 
stronger in the nineties, as shown by the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term between 
the fiscal policy situation and D92.  
 
We can now turn to the more general specification of eq. 5. Standard specification tests (not 
reported here, for the sake of brevity) show that the level of GDP per capita plays no significant role 
in determining the aggregate level of foreign aid. This is not particularly surprising, given that our 
specification already includes both time and country fixed effects that, taken together, will typically 
pick up the impact of cross country differences in income level and their (gradual) evolution over 
time.  
 
The results of estimating eq. 5 are reported in table 3. Again we test and then impose the restriction 
that the coefficients  on debt (B/GDP) and on deficit (D/GDP) should be equal, i.e. that β1 = β2. To 
save on space, we focus on the standard and more widely used definition of foreign aid (ODA), 
which is more likely to capture the attention of (politically motivated) decision makers. In column 
1, we present the results for the full sample. Two facts stand out (column 1). First, the fiscal policy 
stance maintains its role as a key determinant of spending on foreign aid. Second, as expected, a 
more conservative political orientation is associated with a lower volume of foreign aid, but this 
effect is not significant at conventional statistical levels. Even when we interact the fiscal policy 
stance with the political orientation variable, the latter is not statistically significant (column 2). 
Matters are virtually unchanged when we focus on the EU countries. In the specification where both 
the fiscal policy stance and the political orientation enter separately, only the former is statistically 
                                                 
4 The restriction β1 = β2 is never rejected in any specifications. In the remainder of this paper therefore we only present 
the constrained estimates.    14
significant (column 3). When interacted, all lose statistical significance (column 4). Taken together, 
these findings seem to suggest that the impact of political variables is at best muted.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Advocates of greater spending on foreign aid face a difficult dilemma. They can lobby for a special 
and differential budgetary treatment for official development assistance. They may even succeed in 
this endeavour. However, this strategy is loaded  with risks. Suppose that, as it seems to be the case 
in the EU, additional lobbies also succeed in pushing for a more favourable treatment of other 
government programs (public investment, research and development, domestic security, defence, 
the transitional cost of  structural reforms). Two things can happen, then. First, the list of 
exceptional items is sufficiently long that in the end none of them gets a favoured treatment. 
Second, policy makers bow to pressures and, as result, the size of the budget deficit deteriorates 
markedly. What would be the ultimate effect on foreign aid under this scenario? For the sake of 
illustration effect let assume (quite optimistically, given the exceedingly long list of exceptions and 
their sheer size in the budget) that the budget deterioration is equal to 1% of GDP. There will then 
be two negative repercussions on foreign aid. First, the direct effect of a larger budget deficit means 
that foreign aid will be curtailed. We have seen however that this direct effect, while potentially 
relevant, is harder to identify econometrically. Second, a permanently larger budget deficit will fuel 
the growth in the stock of public debt. With a nominal growth in GDP equal to 4% - a reasonable 
value for the EU as a whole – the steady state stock of public sector debt would increase by 25% of 
GDP. Our estimates suggest that by itself this would lead to a fall of 0.1% of the GDP share of 
foreign aid. This is a fairly large value that is equivalent to a third of the EU total development 
assistance and would virtually wipe out the Italian budget for foreign aid.  
 
These estimates must be taken with considerable caution. They assume for instance the effects of 
fiscal policy to be linear and, even more crucially, to be the same among countries. Still, they 
provide a useful benchmark to assess the effectiveness of alternative strategies to boost the amount 
of public spending on foreign aid. What our results show is that even if we neglect the direct effect 
of  a budgetary deterioration on the policy makers’ propensity to commit resources to foreign aid 
the indirect effect working through the stock of debt can be quite large and easily more than wipe 
out the initial gains stemming from a more favourable fiscal treatment of foreign aid. In short, 
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dep var:       
  
TOF        
(% of GDP) 
ODA        
(% of GDP)
NAT        
(% of GDP)
TOF        
(% of GDP)
ODA        
(% of GDP) 
NAT        
(% of GDP)
Constant  0.2132***  0.1233***  0.1141***  0.2121***  0.1256***  0.1163*** 
   0.0291  0.0237  0.0255  0.0298  0.0229  0.0243 
Dep Var (t-1)  0.4680***  0.7790***  0.7696***  0.4706***  0.7743***  0.7648*** 
   0.0849  0.0505  0.0599  0.0856  0.0488  0.0569 
Output Gap   -0.0006  0.0037  0.0044  -0.0009  0.0041  0.0047 
   0.0029  0.0031  0.0033  0.0027  0.0030  0.0031 
Net Lending(t-1)   -0.0021  0.0006  0.0006  -  -  - 
   0.0021  0.0015  0.0015       
Gross Debt (t-1)  -0.0012***  -0.0006**  -0.0005**  -  -  - 
   0.0003  0.0003  0.0003       
Net Lending(t-1) + 
Gross Debt (t-1)  -  -  -  -0.0012***  -0.0007***  -0.0006*** 
         0.0003  0.0003  0.0003 
Sample   1981-2004  1981-2004  198-2004  1981-2004  1981-2004  198-2004 
n° obs.  325  333  333  325  333  333 
n° cross-section  15  15  15  15  15  15 
Time specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2   0.78  0.92  0.93  0.78  0.92  0.93 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis;  
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
**    statistically significant at the 5% level 
*      statistically significant at the 10% level 










dep var:       
  
TOF        
(% of GDP) 
ODA        
(% of GDP)
NAT        
(% of GDP)
TOF        
(% of GDP)
ODA        
(% of GDP) 
NAT        
(% of GDP)
Constant  0.3094***  0.1648***  0.1590***  0.3122***  0.1595***  0.1536*** 
   0.0508  0.0342  0.0353  0.0510  0.0356  0.0376 
Dep Var (t-1)  0.4160***  0.7525***  0.7442***  0.4104***  0.7615***  0.7535*** 
   0.0958  0.0519  0.0586  0.0966  0.0552  0.0619 
Output Gap   0.0004  0.0057*  0.0064*  0.0008  0.0053  0.0060* 
   0.0031  0.0033  0.0034  0.0035  0.0033  0.0034 
Fiscal Policy(t-1)   -0.0022***  -0.0010***  -0.0010***  -0.0020***  -0.0013***  -0.0012*** 
   0.0005  0.0004  0.0004  0.0007  0.0005  0.0004 
D92 × Fiscal Policy(t-1)  -  -  -  -0.0003  0.0005  0.0005 
         0.0005  0.0004  0.0004 
Sample   1981-2004  1981-2004  1981-2004  1981-2004  1981-2004  1981-2004 
n° obs.  254  261  261  254  261  261 
n° cross-section  12  12  12  12  12  12 
Time specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2   0.75  0.90  0.92  0.75  0.90  0.92 
 
Note: see table 1.  




Foreign aid, fiscal policy, and political orientation 
 
   All countries  EU countries 
dep var:  ODA        
(% of GDP)
ODA        
(% of GDP)
ODA        
(% of GDP)
ODA        
(% of GDP) 
Constant  0.1476***  0.1805***  0.1845***  0.1548*** 
   0.0297  0.0499  0.0419  0.055128 
Dep Var (t-1)  0.7757***  0.7712***  0.7558***  0.7577*** 
   0.0495  0.0505  0.0514  0.051271 
Output Gap   0.0037  0.0037  0.0053  0.0055* 
   0.0031  0.0030  0.0034  0.003283 
Fiscal Policy (t-1)   -0.0007***  -0.0013*  -0.0010***  -0.0005 
   0.0003  0.0007  0.0004  0.000970 
Political Orientation (t-1)  -0.0037  -0.0084  -0.0039  0.0010 
   0.0027  0.0063  0.0041  0.008604 
(Political Orientation × 
Fiscal Policy)(t-1)  -  0.0001  -  -0.0001 
     0.0001    0.000168 
Sample   1981-2004  1981-2004  1981-2004  1981-2004 
n° obs.  330  330  259  259 
n° cross-section  15  15  12  12 
Time specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country specific effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2   0.92  0.92  0.90  0.90 
 
Note: see table 1.  
Legend: Fiscal policy= net lending + gross debt 
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Appendix 
 
Table A – IPS test for panel Unit Roots 
 




Gross Debt  
(%) 
Net ODA    
(% GDP) 
Net TOF     
(% GDP) 
NAT        
(% of GDP)
   Level  Level  Level  Diff(1)  Level   Diff(1) 
t-bar  -5.35745  -2.68016 -1.73776 -6.98663  -8.26780  -7.88695
Prob ( Ψ )*  0.00000  0.00370 0.04110 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000
Lags  1 to 4  0 to 4  0 to 3  0 to 4  0 to 4  0 to 4 
Trend  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes 
Country fixed effects   yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Cross-Sections  15  15  15  15  15  15 
Sample  1980-2004  1980-2004  1980-2004  1980-2004  1980-2004  1980-2004 
Obs  322  328  340  307  295  307 
* Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality 